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| M£0 still ablaze on the day after she was hit. See Chapter 8, Just a Number (right). |
It is often said that the history of wars is always written
by the victors so it is good that this article relies heavily on the researches
of Gunter Hartnagel, an expert on the use of German artillery in the Gallipoli campaign, with whom I hope I can remain in in contact, and Peter Jung who was
working for the Austrian State/War Archive War Archive when he died in 2003.
Shortly after Admiral Souchon arrived in Constantinople on
10 August, 1914, with the German warships Goeben and Breslau, he asked for
additional support from his government in providing a defence for the
Dardanelles, a request which supported by Enver Pasha, the Turkish Minister of
War, and was repeated during the fight for the Gallipoli peninsula. However,
little material help was able to pass through the Balkans until Serbia was
defeated in the autumn of 1915, and supply lines were opened. Two Austro-Hungarian
artillery units, the Haubitzbatterie No.36 and Motormorserbatterie No.9, were
then transported down the Danube and, arriving on station at the end of
November, played a vital part in
the final 5 weeks of conflict before the last invading Allied soldiers were
driven from the Gallipoli peninsula during the night of 8/9 January, 1916.
The subsequent Allied occupation of Long Island (Chustan) in
the Gulf of Smyrna posed a threat to the city itself and, after a visit to the
area to review the situation, General Liman von Sanders ordered the Haubitzbatterrie
No.36 to relocate in a protective position covering Smyrna thus providing a
well trained and efficient force to reinforce the Turkish gunners manning the
coastal defences of the Gulf.
During the spring of 1916 the Turks moved to bring Long
Island under fire from all sides but transporting heavy artillery over broken ground
was extremely difficult, particularly through the wild countryside of the Kara
Burnu peninsula, so General General Liman von Sanders asked his fellow
countryman Admiral Souchon, now
commanding the Turkish Navy, for help. As a result 2 daring voyages from Smyrna to Cape Aspro
(mentioned in Chapter 8) were made by vessels under the overall command of Oberleutnant
Missuweit of the German Navy carrying howitzers, ammunition, gun crews and
staff from the Haubitzbatterie No.36.
The guns were mounted in pits already prepared for them in a position
south of Mordovan and opened fire on Long Island for the first time on 6 May in
cooperation with Turkish batteries.
German reports suggest that it was the guns of the No.36 battery which
sank M30 during the evening of 13
May and, given the accuracy of the shelling as reported by M30’s captain,
Lt.Commnander Lockyer, this seems a more likely conclusion than it was the result
of fire from by their Turkish counterparts.
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| The fires have died out: M30, aground, awaits the salvage party. See Chapter 8, Just A Number (right). |
The well planned covert evacuation of Long Island was carried
out so efficiently over the nights of 26, 27 and 28 May that the Turkish H.Q.
did not discover that the entire Allied force had left until over a fortnight
later when a small German naval detachment, armed with 8 machine guns, was
dispatched from Gul-Bache Bay, to examine the situation on the island. This patrol was commanded by Oisberleutnant
Missuweit and consisted of 3 other officers and 12 private soldiers.
Michael Hanna
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